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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jerry Judd (JUDD) owns 1.3 acre parcel of waterfront property on Lake Coeur d'Alene.

The parcel has 100 foet of frontage on the lake and can only be accessed via the water. The
entire parcel is on a steep hillside with rocky cliffs at the water's edge.
Because of the steep terrain of the parcel, JUDD constructed three decks at the shoreline
to provide a flat area for recreational use of the land. 1 The main deck (20' x 20') was built into
the hillside and supported with concrete pilings placed below the ordinary high water line. A
second 12' x 12' deck was built approximately 11 feet above the main deck, and a third 12' x 8'
deck was built approximately 15 feet above the main deck. [A.R. p. 45]
When JUDD purchased the parcel in 2002, it had existing docks and pilings permitted by
the Idaho Department of Lands, (A.R. p. 46; Tr. p. 22, L. 10-14] and existing stairways used to
access a power pole on the property. JUDD constructed the upper decks to replace the existing
stairways and to provide safe access to the power pole and the adjacent parcel. [Tr. p. 23, L. 114]
In June of 2005, the Army Corps of Engineers sent a letter to JUDD regarding the
concrete pilings placed below the high water line. [A.R. p. 148] A copy of this letter was sent to
Kootenai County. In response, Kootenai County issued a code violation notice for the
construction of the decks within the 25 foot front setback and 10 foot side setback established by
the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance. (A.R. p. 167] JUDD met with County staff and was

1

Color photographs showing the three decks and the topography of the parcel are in the Agency Record at page 43.
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informed that he could apply for a variance to resolve the code violation. [AR. p. 132] JUDD
applied for the necessary variance in September of 2005. [AR. p. 73-76]
The JUDD variance application was heard by Kootenai County Hearing Examiner Gary
Young in March of 2006. [Tr. p. 1-12] At the hearing, Carl Washburn of the Idaho Department
of Lands testified that he would help JUDD apply for the necessary permit to approve the
concrete pilings placed below the ordinary high water line. [Tr. p. 9, L. 23-25; p. 10, L. 1-11]
Prior to the hearing, the Army Corps sent a second letter to JUDD stating that the concrete
footings supporting the main deck were not causing any discernable adverse effects on the
aquatic environment and the Corps did not intend to take any further action on the matter. [AR.
p. 87]
In addition to the testimony of JUDD and Carl Washburn, the Hearing Examiner received
four written comments in support of the variance request and two neutral comments. There was
no public opposition to the JUDD variance request. [A.R. p. 167]
The Hearing Examiner issued written findings and conclnsions, and recommended to the
Board of County Commissioners that the variance request be denied. In his report the Hearing
Examiner determined that an undue hardship would result from the literal enforcement of the 25
foot setback requirement due to the steep topography of the property. However, the Hearing
Examiner concluded that the requested variance failed "to meet the requirement of public interest
and the intent of the zoning ordinance, specifically Section 30.03d." [AR. p. 168]
JUDD requested a second public hearing before the Board of County Commissioners and
the Board granted that request. [Tr. p. 13-17] Prior to the Board hearing, JUDD resolved all
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outstanding issues with the Idaho Department of Lands and received an official "notice of
compliance" from the Department on May 30, 2006. [A.R. p. 140]
The Board of County Commissioners conducted its hearing on June 1, 2006. At the
hearing JUDD presented a copy of the May 30, 2006 compliance letter from the Idaho
Department of Lands. [Board Tr. p. 18, L. 12-24; A.R. p. 191] 2 JUDD also testified that the
size of the main deck was reduced to 15' x 20' at the request of the Army Corps of Engineers.
[Board Tr. p. 19, L. 1-7]

Prior to the hearing, the Board of Commissioners received 5 written comments in support
of the variance request and 2 neutral comments. There was no written comment or public
testimony in opposition to the variance application. [Board Tr. p. 18, L. 5-6]
The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners heard the JUDD variance request, a
similar variance request by James and Penny Wohrle, and a third variance request by Ted
Baycroft at the hearing on June 1, 2006. These public hearings were conducted in succession, ·
and after the hearings, the Board deliberated on all three requests simultaneously. [Board Tr. p.
7, L. 18-22] After closing the last public hearing on the Baycroft variance, Commissioner
Johnson introduced a new issue with the following comment to the other commissioners:
Before we begin deliberations, something that has come up over
this testimony on all three of them that is the same, is, the
buildable versus non-buildable on the description of the lot.
And something that I would like to check on before we make that
decisions, that we may have to take this deliberations to another
week, is something I want to check on is at, through the
Assessor's Office, I would like to see the assessment on these ...
2

"Board Tr." refers to the combined transcript of the County Commissioners' hearings and deliberations for all
three variance requests on June l, 2006.
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on whether or not these lots are assessed as buildable or nonbuildable lot. That brings up an issue here that was brought up
on all three of these as to whether they were buildable or not.
Especially when (inaudible) that there is power down to one of
those that they could share. Is that something that you guys
would entertain or not?
[Board Tr. p. 35, lines 17-24; p. 36, L. 1-7]
Although the 2005 Assessor's records for the JUDD parcel were already part of the
record from the Hearing Examiner's hearing, [A.R. p. 138] the Commissioners sent a staff
person to the Assessor's office to find out if the property was assessed as "buildable" or "nonbuildable." [Board Tr. p. 37, L.1-11]
During deliberations, Commissioner Brodie asked all three applicants whether they knew
if their property was assessed as "buildable" or "non-buildable." [Board Tr. p. 37, L. 12] Ted
Baycroft responded and, at the suggestion of the county attorney, the Baycroft public hearing
was reopened to allow Mr. Baycroft to testify. [Board Tr. p. 37, L. 19-25] After a brief comment
by Mr. Baycroft, Commissioner Johnson interrupted and Commissioner Currie made a motion to
again close the Baycroft hearing. The motion was approved without discussion and without
allowing JUDD any opportunity to respond to Commissioner Brodie's question whether their

property was "buildable" or "non-buildable." [Board Tr. p. 38, L. 8-25; p. 39, L. 1-7]
After a briefrecess, the following comments were made during deliberations by
Commissioner Johnson:
We are back from a recess. Uh, Debbie Wilson went downstairs to
the Assessor's Office and received the Assessor's, uh, Valuation
Sheet and coding of the land type of these types of properties
for James Wohrle, Jerry Judd, and Theodore Baycroft.
[Board Tr. p. 40, L. 2-6]
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Chairman Johnson: Um, under Mr. Wohrle, .on all three of them, I
can go, I will lump them all three together. On the land type,
uh, under one classification, waterfront vacant, non-buildable.
And then they have remaining acreage of the, of the one acre is
non-buildable, the remaining acreage is a .62. On Mr. Judd's,
wait a minute, I just read Mr. Judds, .62. On Mr. Baycroft's, he
has a .688 of remaining acreage at number two, waterfront vacant,
non-buildable, of the one acre. And on Mr. Wohrle's, it is
remaining acreage of the .688 and one acre of waterfront vacant
non-buildable. On all three classifications, on all three pieces
of property. The reason I asked for that, because when you, when
those lots were purchased. And we all, we've lived here long
enough to know those lots were waterfront, yes, but at a nonbuildable rate, taxable, that meant they were less, the value of
the property was also less than what you would normally find
around the rest of the lake on a buildable lot.
Commissioner Brodie: Right.

[Board Tr. p. 41, L. 1-18]
At this point, County attorney Pat Braden suggested that the Commissioners should allow
each applicant to view the new information from the Assessor's office and offer rebuttal. The
Commissioners then reopened the Wohrle public hearing again and Commissioner Johnson had
the following exchange with Mr. Wohrle:
Chairman Johnson: This is what we received from the Assessor's
Office on your property and we want to allow any comments you'd
like to add.
James Wohrle: Non-buildable, does that mean any structure, such
as a deck, or does that just mean house, or living structure?
Chairman Johnson: What it means is non-buildable, it is all
before a, you're taxed at a non-buildable rate, knowing that the
property would not, uh, qualify to build a home. It doesn't
mean, not the deck, but, what I am trying to, my reason for
asking for this, again, was so that it, it would clarify, because
it has been talked about buildable and non-buildable, that's why
you have to do the decks, and, and that's all I was trying to get
at is a, .uh, when you purchased the property. And, again, it is
a buyer-beware state. When you purchased the property, so you
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purchased a piece of property that was at a value that would be
much less, knowing that it was a dock lot. That's, that's,
that's the purpose of me trying to find this. History provides
us with the properties on that lake, on that side of the lake,
they are non-accessible. Everybody knew it for years and years
and years. When folks were buying them for a dock lot. They
knew they could put a dock in, tie their boat up, and still have,
be on the water. That is why the values are a lot less. And
when I look at these, uh, decks that are being put on now and
protruding over the water and what not, some are on their own
property, but they are building these, these things, I'm not sure
if that was the purpose, intent of those lots to be built on in
that manner. They were going to be, again, be called dock lots.
And that was the only purpose, I was trying to find out where we
were at on this cause it was talked about buildable and nonbuildable.
James Wohrle: Well, we never, never entertained the, the fact of
building a home there, we were just doing the dock, the deck for
convenience sake. Like Ted says, we have a place to actually
put, if you looked at all, you know, all of the properties where
people have purchased them, they actually have been digging out
the hillside, making flat areas and it seems to be access,
acceptable. Uh, perhaps because nobody has been sited for it
and, uh, we just did the decks just to, uh, uh, keep the dirt
level down and (inaudible) down and things like that. I know
that ones over the water, which we did take out was, uh, way
beyond what we should have done. I realize that. That is why we
took it out. Probably take the concrete out, um, probably later
on this fall when the water level is down. Because we've done,
we built everything in the off-season, in the fall and winter, so
we didn't, didn't hurt the water quality and things like that.
Chairman Johnson: Okay. Thank you.
James Wohrle: Thank you.
Commissioner Currie: Move the public hearing closed on V-841-05
and move to deliberations after the other two.
Chairman Johnson: Great.

[Board Tr. p. 42, L. 14 through p. 44, L. 15]
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Commissioner Currie's motion was unanimously approved without deliberation and the
Wohrle public hearing was again closed without any further comment from Mr. Wohrle, and
without any opportunity to comment given to Mrs. Wohrle, Mr. Judd, Mr. Baycroft or any of the
other persons in attendance. [Board Tr. p. 44, L. 13-22]
At this point, the hearing for the JUDD variance was reopened for public testimony, and
the following exchange took place:
Jerry Judd: Jerry Judd, 1803 West Mission, Spokane, 99201. With
this in mind, I have a question for ya. That original property,
it already had staircases, power down, I mean, it was built on.
Whether it was assessed that way, and it was done so, in the 70's
by Jim's dad. So for me to, to assume that I couldn't put a deck
there was, something I don't understand. Mainly because it was
clear for it and it was powered down to the deck, there was power
on the staircases, there is a little shed up there that was
built. I mean, it was built on. That's my comment.
Chairman Johnson: What I would offer you, might, just, you, and
refrain to even almost say this, but if were to go with that
theory and said it was a buildable lot ...
Jerry Judd:
there ...

Well, I'm not saying a house, I'm just saying

Chairman Johnson: Well, you can't have it both ways, I mean, the
stairs were there, the power were there, so then, that, then you
would say you, you would assume that that's a buildable lot
there.
[Board Tr. p. 45, L. 7-25]
This discussion ended abruptly with a motion by Commissioner Currie to close public
testimony and move to the next case (Baycroft). [Board Tr. p. 47, L. 5-13] While the JUDD
variance hearing was reopened, none of the other applicants were given the opportunity to speak
or rebut any of the additional testimony given or received by the Commissioners.
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Finally, the Board reopened the Baycroft variance hearing and Mr. Baycroft asked a
relevant question:
Theodore Baycroft: Okay, my question, my, to state it further, I
mean, I went to the Assessor's Office and they gave, they said it
was a neutral position, it hadn't been determined. Obviously,
this information is here. My question is, when did they
determine it was buildable or unbuildable. Because when I went,
they didn't have a determination. And was that determination
after, after they reassessed our property? Because, when I
originally bought the property, they didn't have a determination.
[Board Tr. p. 47, L. 23 through p. 48, L. 7]
Mr.. Baycroft and Commissioner Johnson then engaged in a lengthy debate over the
meaning of the County Assessor records with Commissioner Johnson offering new information,
new testimony and his own legal conclusions. [Board Tr. pp. 48-51] During this dialog, a
woman in the audience tried to disagree with Commissioner Johnson's comments, but she was

not allowed to speak. [Board Tr. p. 49, L. 23-25] Again, without allowing any other person to
testify or rebut this new information, the Board closed the public hearing on the Baycroft
variance and went directly to simultaneous deliberations on all three variance cases. [Board Tr.
p. 52, L. 15-25]
The sum total of deliberations by the County Commissioners on all three cases consists of
the following comments:
Commissioner Brodie: It's ugly. I mean, the bottom line is, I, I
feel very, very sorry for each and every one of you for being
allowed to believe, number one, it was a buildable lot, that you
could do something other than enjoy a dock lot, which is, I think
exactly what you have. Regardless of that, the requirement is,
you build within setbacks and you get a permit first.
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Commissioner Currie: I'm going to take it a step further.
I sit
on the, on a Basin Commission, uh, and there are representatives
from Washington State. Uh, and this tells me that Washington
State's rules are tougher than what ours are. Uh, so, uh, I, I
would think that you would have, uh, looked into the legal
setbacks, especially, I have to complement you, you guys did a
great job in the building process. I, I come from the building
industry and, uh, uh, you did a good job. But, you didn't,
didn't do your homework. Uh, and, uh, rules changed. Uh, uh, I,
I used, I used, my family used to have a place on (inaudible)
couple of years ago. And what we could have done back in the
sixties is different than what we could do today. Uh, and, I
think you should have done your, home, uh, your due home, uh, due
diligence and your homework and your process. So, uh, at, Gus,
do you have anything else to ...
Chairman Johnson:

I don't.

It's been said.

[Board Tr. p. 53, L. 7 through p. 54, L. 4]
Without further deliberation, the Commissioners unanimously voted to sustain the
Hearing Examiner's recommendation to deny the JUDD variance and ordered JUDD to remove
the decks within 60 days. [Board Tr. p. 54, L. 5-23]

Two weeks later, the Board issued written

findings of fact, conclusions of law and an Order of Decision. [A.R. p. 174]
On a petition for judicial review of the Board's written Order, the district court allowed
JUDD to supplement the record with evidence of a similar variance request by Stephen and Mary
Iacoboni. [R. p. 86] The Iacoboni variance was for a staircase built without a building permit
and in violation of the 5 foot setback for the sides of the parcel. The staircase was built to
provide access to the shore of Hayden Lake. [R. p. 11-42] The Iacoboni variance was approved
by the Board of Commissioners against the recommendation of the Hearing Examiner three
weeks after the JUDD and WOHRLE variances were denied. [R. p. 25-29]
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Foilowing briefing and oral argument, the district court held that the evidence supported a
finding that JUDD would suffer an undue hardship from a literal enforcement of the 25 foot
setback requirement. [Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 49, L. 8-9] The district court also found that there was no
evidence to support the County's conclusion that the variance was in conflict with the public
interest. [Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 49, L. 9-11; p. 50, L. 13-20] Based on these findings, the court
concluded that the decision of the County Commissioners was arbitrary and capricious and an
abuse of discretion. [Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 50, L. 21 - p. 51, L. 3] The district court remanded the
matter back to the Board of Commissioners to detennine if the requested variance was "the
minimum that will make possible the reasonable use of the land, building ot structure," as
required under Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance §30.03. [Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 51, L. 4-22; R p.
141]
JUDD sought an award of attorney fees and costs under LC. § 12-117 and the issue was
separately briefed by both sides and submitted without oral argument. The district court awarded
attorney fees and costs to JUDD in a memorandum decision and order. [R. p. 140]

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
6.

Whether the decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners was
made upon unlawful procedure.

7.

Whether the decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners was
not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

8.

Whether JUDD is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code 12-

117.
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III.

ARGUMENT

1.

The District Court did not err in allowing the record to be augmented.

Kootenai County makes four arguments in support of its claim that the District Court
erred in allowing the record to be augmented with evidence from another variance decision by
the Board of Commissioners.
First, the County states that Civil Rule 84(1) governs the district court's ability to
augment the record on a petition for judicial review. [Appellant's Brief, p. 7J This statement is
'

incorrect. Rule 84(a)(l) clearly states that the procedures and standards for judicial review of
local government actions "shall be as provided by statute." Rule 84 only applies when a statute
does not supply the·necessary procedure or standard ofreview. Because Idaho Code §67-5276
supplies both the procedure and standards to determine whether additional evidence should be·
considered on a petition for judicial review, Civil Rule 84(1) does not apply.
Under LC. §67-5276 the party seeking to supplement the record must show that the .
additional evidence is (1) material, (2) relates to the validity of the agency action, and (3) there
are good reasons for the failure to present the additional evidence to the agency, or (4) there were
alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency.
The second argument made by Kootenai County is that the Iacoboni variance information
was not "material" to the district court's review of the JUDD variance. As noted above, the
Board of Commissioners denied the JUDD variance because granting the variance would
"legitimize the Applicants' construction of decks without required building permits, which
would be considered a special privilege;" [A.R. p. 178, 1 5.02] and because the "variance is not
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necessary to accommodate the recreational use of the property and would be detrimental to
sun-ounding properties and the public welfare if zero setbacks and lake encroaclnnents were to be
allowed, even by special permit." (A.R. p. 178, ,r 5.03]
The record clearly shows that the Commissioners did not want to reward JUDD by
granting the variance request for decks constructed without building permits. For JUDD, the
Commissioners concluded that it would be contrary to the public interest to do so. Three weeks
later, the same Commissioners reached the opposite conclusion on the Iacoboni variance request
for a staircase constructed without building permits. The Iacoboni variance information was
material to the district court's review because it showed that it is not a "special privilege" to
receive a variance after the fact for improvements constructed without a building permit, and that
building without a permit does not automatically disqualify the improvements for a variance.
Secondly, the Iacoboni information was material to show that the Commissioners' decision on
the JUDD variance was arbitrary and capricious. A contradictory decision made on nearly
identical facts is relevant evidence of arbitrary and capricious behavior that "relates to the
validity of the agency action." LC. §67-5276(1)
The third objection offered by Kootenai County is that, "the Board did not hear the
Iacoboni application after it had made its decision on Judd's request." [Appellant's Brief, p. IO]
This statement by the County is simply not correct. The JUDD variance request was heard by the
Board of Commissioners on June I, 2006. The Iacoboni variance request was heard and
unanimously approved by the Board of Commissioners on June 22, 2006. [R. p. 28]
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The County's fourth argument is that the Iacoboni variance information was not evidence
of"alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency ... " LC. 67-5276(l)(b) The County
interprets §67-5276 as requiring the applicant to show both (a) good reason for failing to present
the additional evidence and (b) alleged procedural irregularities. The plain language and
punctuation of the statute do not support this interpretation. 3
Finally, to the extent it was error for the District Court to receive additional evidence
outside of the agency record, such error was harmless as it did not impact the District Court's
decision. As this Court stated in Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, (2000):
The district judge's error here, however, was harmless. The burden is upon the Board
to establish a prejudicial error and error is prejudicial only if it could have affected or did
affect the outcome of a proceeding. See Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho
299,306,805 P.2d 1223, 1230 (1991). Here, the Board has not shown that its rights were
prejudiced as a result of the district judge's decision to include the additional information.
The district judge, in his Opinion Re: Petition for Judicial Review, did not mention the
Board's prior approval of single-family residential subdivisions in the A-20 zone or the
Prairie Sun Ranch Subdivision in the A-20 zone. Instead, the district judge focused on the
Board's misapplication of the comprehensive plan and misinterpretation of Bone. The
additional evidence thus appears to have played no role in the district judge's decision
and its admission constituted, at most, harmless error.

Id. at 361.
Here, as in Urrutia, the district court did not once mention the Iacoboni information as a
basis for its final decision. If it was error for the district court to supplement the agency record
with the Iacoboni information, such error was harmless.

3

Nevertheless, JUDD argued extensively that the Commissioners' decision was the result of improper procedure
and violation of JUD D's due process rights.
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2.

The District Court did not err in finding the Commissioners' decision to be
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.

Under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, a reviewing court, "shall not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency as to.the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." §675279(1) The reviewing court should defer to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous or not supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. Fischer v. City of
Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352 (2005). "A variance request, like a rezoning request, focuses

upon a specific parcel of property. It invokes a quasi-judicial power. Moreover, a variance
request contemplates no modification of the zoning ordinance. It is governed strictly by existing
ordinance requirements. Therefore, in reviewing a variance decision, our function is to
determine whether the zoning board's findings are supported by substantial evidence and, if so,
whether the board's conclusions properly apply the zoning ordinance to the facts as found." City
ofBurley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,909 (Ct. App. 1984).

In this case, an independent review of the agency record should lead to the same
conclusion reached by the district court. In their written Order of Decision, the County
Commissioners made the following findings of fact:
I.

The JUDD parcel is a steep, north facing slope with a shoreline of mostly rock with some
brush and moss, and accessible only by boat. [A.R. p. 181, ,r 2.03 and 2.07]

2.

Most of the parcel is steep and unstable with only the shoreline suitable for building.
(A.R. p. 181, ,r 2.02]
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3.

There are three decks on the parcel. The largest deck was built into the hillside with
pilings located below the high water mark. [A.R. p. 181, ,r 2.02]

4.

The three decks were built without building permits. [A.R. p. 181, ,r 2.05]

5.

There is no water or sewage services on the parcel. [A.R. p. 181, ,r 2.09]

6.

The surrounding land use consists primarily of vacant lots and float homes. [A.R. p. 181,

,r 2.06]
7.

There was no objection to the requested variance from the East Side Fire District. [A.R.

p. 182, ,r 2.11]
8.

The Idaho Department of Lands approved the deck pilings below the ordinary high water
mark. [A.R. p. 182, ,r 2.12]

9.

The Army Corps of Engineers determined that the concrete footings supporting the decks
were not causing any discemable adverse effects on the aquatic environment and the
broken rock placed below the ordinary high water mark is minor and causing little impact
to aquatic resources. [A.R. p. 182, ,r 2.13]

10.

There was no public opposition to the variance application. [A.R. p. 182, ,r 2.16]; and

11.

JUDD met with County staff on several occasions to address and rectify the County's
code violation notice. [A.R. p. 182, ,r 3.01]
Based on these findings of fact, the Board of Commissioners made conclusions oflaw

including that a literal enforcement of the setback would result in an "undue hardship" for
JUDD. [A.R. p. 184, ,r 5.01] Nevertheless, the Board denied the variance request because:
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I.

"The issuance of variances that not only encroach into the required setback but also the
lakebed is not in the public interest and would allow a benefit that is not afforded to other
property owners fronting Coeur d'Alene Lake." (A.R. p. 184, ,i 5.01]

2.

Granting the requested variance is contrary to Idaho Code §67-6516 because it would
"legitimize the Applicant's construction of decks without required building permits,
which would be considered a special privilege." [A.R. p. 184, ,i 5.02]

3.

The "variance is not necessary to accommodate the recreational use of the property and
would be detrimental to surrounding properties and the public welfare if zero setbacks
and lake encroachments were to be allowed, even by special permit." (A.R. p. 184, ,i
5.03]
The district court determined that these conclusions were not supported by substantial,

competent evidence in the record. The district court did not substitute its judgment for that of the
County as to the weight of the evidence, instead the court determined that there was no evidence
to weigh in support of the County's conclusion that the variance would be "in conflict with the
public interest." l.C. §65-6516.
There is no evidence in the record to support the Commissioners' first conclusion oflaw:
"The issuance of variances that not only encroach into the required setback but also the lakebed
is not in the public interest and would allow a benefit that is not afforded to other property
owners fronting Coeur d'Alene Lake." (A.R. p. 184, ,i 5.01] Every variance, by definition
involves "a modification of the bulk and placement requirements of the ordinance as to lot size,
lot coverage, width, depth, front yard, side yard, rear yard, setbacks, parking space, height of
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buildings, or other ordinance provision affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement
of the structure upon lots, or the size oflots." LC. §67-6516
A variance request can't be denied simply because it seeks a modification of a setback. 4
And yet, the Board of Commissioners concluded that the JUDD variance was not in the public
interest because it involved an encroachment into the required setback! Obviously there is no
evidence in the record to support this ridiculous conclusion by the County. Nor is there any
evidence in the record to support the conclusion that an encroachment into the lakebed is in
conflict with the public interest. N onnavigational lakebed encroachments are regulated by the
Idaho Department of Lands. Idaho Code §58-1306 sets forth the process for nonnavigational
encroachment permits to be requested, evaluated and approved. Clearly, encroachments into the
lakebed are not per se in conflict with the public interest. Moreover, JUDD presented a letter to
the Board of Commissioners from the Idaho Department of Lands stating that the deck
construction "waterward of the ordinary high water mark" was in compliance with the
Department's requirements. [A.R. p. 140]
The Board of Commissioners did not make any finding of fact that the requested variance
was in conflict with the public interest because there was no evidence to support such a finding.
Instead, the Board simply concluded that the requested variance would be contrary to the public
interest because it involved a variance of the setback distance and a lakebed encroachment. The
district court correctly held that this conclusion was not supported by any evidence in the record.

4

That would be like denying a request for a driver's license because the applicant intends to use the license to drive.
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In their second conclusion of law, the Board of Commissioners stated that granting the
requested variance would "legitimize the Applicants' construction of decks without required
building permits, which would be considered a special privilege." [A.R. p. 184, ,i 5.02] It is
uncontested that JUDD built the three decks without building permits. The record also clearly
shows that this mistake was not an attempt to cheat the system, but was the result of simple
ignorance of the building permit requirement. [A.R. p. 165, iJl.03] Of course, after JUDD
discovered this error, he sought to correct his mistake. However, the County would not issue a
building permit for the decks until and unless a variance for the setback was approved first.
JUDD was not seeking the variance as a reward for building without a permit; JUDD applied for
the variance on the County's recommendation as the first necessary step to correct his nonconforming decks.
The JUDD decks were not the first structures to be built in Idaho without building
permits. Like most jurisdictions in Idaho, Kootenai County has a process for enforcing building
permit requirements. Typically a "red tag" or "stop work" notice is posted on the construction
site. The builder is required to apply for a permit and typically must pay a penalty fee. If
inspection of the work reveals any building code violations or defects, those defects must be
corrected before the work can continue. It is not the law in Idaho or Kootenai County that
construction built without a valid permit must automatically be torn down before the builder can
. apply for the necessary permit. Such a rule would be wasteful, punitive and serve no legitimate
purpose. And yet, the Board of Commissioners ordered that JUDD had to tear down the decks

· Respondents' Brief - Judd v. Kootenai County

Page 18

before he could apply for a variance. The Commissioners' Order of Decision concludes with the
following remarks:
"After the code violations have been remedied as ordered above, the Applicants may
apply for a building permit and site disturbance permit to allow construction of deck(s) or
structure(s) in compliance with the adopted ordinances of Kootenai County. The
Applicants may also choose to request a variance of lesser encroachment." [A.R. p. 184]
As the district court noted, the Board of Commissioners were clearly "sidetracked on the
fact that the deck was already built." [Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 49, L. 19-20] The Commissioners
arbitrarily applied a new rule to the JUDD variance request - if you build improvements without
a permit in a setback area, you can not get a variance to cure your mistake until after you remove
the improvements. This rule is not found in Idaho Code or the Kootenai County Zoning
Ordinance and it was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion for the Board of
Commissioners to apply such a rule to the JUDD variance request.

5

Finally, there is no evidence in the record to support the Board's third conclusion of law,
that the "variance is not necessary to accommodate the recreational use of the property and
would be detrimental to surrounding properties and the public welfare if zero setbacks and lake
encroachments were to be allowed, even by special permit." [A.R. p. 184,, 5.03] On the
contrary, all the evidence demonstrated that the requested variance was essential to have
reasonable use of the land and was not in conflict with the public interest.
Perhaps the best evidence to support the necessity of the decks is the photos showing the
topography of the property at the only point of access - the shoreline. In order to have any safe

5

lt should not be overlooked that the same Commissioners approved a variance for the Iacoboni staircase, built in a
setback area without a building permit, three weeks after they denied the Judd variance.
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and reasonable use of his land, JUDD had to have a relatively flat surface to sit or stand upon.
Prior to construction of the decks, there was no natural area along the shoreline of the JUDD
parcel that would allow safe and reasonable use of the land. The largest deck was placed so that
it would not be submerged during high water levels and would be reasonably accessible during
low water seasons.

6

Again, all of the evidence supported a finding that the decks were

necessary to make reasonable use of the land, and there was no evidence or testimony that a
lesser variance would allow reasonable use of the land. Nevertheless, on this issue only, the
district court remanded the matter back to the County for further hearing.
With respect to the Board's conclusion that the variance would be detrimental to
surrounding properties and the public welfare, there is absolutely no evidence to support such a
conclusion. There was no public opposition to the JUDD variance, only support. There was no
agency opposition and all initial objections of the Army Corps and Department of Lands were
resolved. Even the County code violations were resolved through JUDD's compliance with
County staff requirements. [A.R. p. 182,, 3.01]
Despite all this evidence of no conflict with the public interest, the County claims that
"substantial and undisputed evidence" supports the County's decision. [Appellant's Brief. p. 13]
The alleged substantial evidence consists of two items: (I) the decks were built within the
setback area without a variance, and (2) the decks were built without building permits. As
explained above, neither of these facts supports the County's conclusion that the requested
variance was in conflict with the public interest or would confer a special privilege on JUDD.
6

The top photo at page 43 of the Agency Record shows the high water line on the rocks.
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The JUDD variance decision should have been made on the facts in the record and
according to the legal standards found in LC. §67-6516 and the County Zoning Ordinance.
Instead, Kootenai County arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the relevant facts in the record
and applied a new legal standard that improvements constructed without a permit are inherently
contrary to the public interest and automatically disqualified from receiving a variance. The
district court correctly held that the County's decision to deny the JUDD variance was
unsupported by the facts and contrary to Idaho law and the adopted standards in the County
Zoning Ordinance. 7

3.

The County's decision prejudiced substantial rights of JUDD.

This Court recently held that a private property owner has a substantial right to have a
land use application evaluated properly and under the correct code. Lane Ranch Partnership v.
City ofSun Valley, Docket No. 33423, at p. 5 (Idaho 12-27-2007). As argued above, the
Kootenai County Commissioners did not properly evaluate the JUDD variance request and did
not apply the correct legal standards to that request. As in Lane Ranch, the County's decision in
this case deprived JUDD of the ability to have reasonable access to and use of his land.
In addition, JUDD was denied meaningful due process by the manner in which his
hearing was conducted by the Board of Commissioners. In Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork
v. Valley County, Docket No. 33552, (Idaho 12-27-2007) this Court stated:
Procedural due process requires some process to ensure that the individual is not
arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions.

7

Although not cited by the district court, the Commissioners contradicted every rationale for their decision in Judd
when they approved the lacoboni variance three weeks later.
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Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512, 148 P.3d at 1258. This requirement is met when the defendant
is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. The opportunity to be heard
must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in order to satisfy the due
process requirement.

Id. at 6.
When a governing body sits in a quasi-judicial capacity, it must confine its decision to the
record produced at the public hearing. Failing to do so is a violation of procedural due process
of law. Chambers v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 125 Idaho 115, 118 (1994);
Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407,411 (1980); Gay v.
Board ofCounty Commissioners ofBonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,629 (Ct.App. 1982).
This Court has also observed that when a governing body deviates from the public record, it
essentially conducts a second fact-gathering session without proper notice in violation of due
process. Chambers, 125 Idaho at 118.
In this case, the transcript of the Commissioners' hearing shows clear violations of
JUDD's due process rights. After closing the public hearing, the Commissioners went on a factfinding mission to explore whether the JUDD property was "buildable or non-buildable". The
Commissioners apparently believed this question was critical to their decision despite the fact
that whether land is assessed as "buildable" or "non-buildable" is not relevant under Idaho Code
§67-6516 or the Kootenai County zoning ordinance. The record shows that the Commissioners
sent a staff person to gather new evidence from the Assessor's office despite the fact that the
issue had not been discussed by staff or raised during the Hearing Examiner's hearing. JUDD
had no notice that this issue was going to be raised by the governing body.
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After the Commissioners reviewed and commented on the new evidence collected from
the Assessor's office, the hearing was reopened to allow JUDD to respond. 8 It is obvious from
the hearing transcript that Mr. Judd believed his property was "buildable" because it had existing
structures, stairways and power when he purchased the land. [Board Tr. p. 45, L. 7-16] The
Commissioners' comments appear to suggest that the JUDD parcel would have had a higher
assessed value if it was a "buildable" parcel. [Board Tr. p. 46, L. 3-1 OJ Without ever resolving
the "buildable" vs. "non-buildable" debate, the Commissioners cut off further testimony and
moved to deliberations. [Board Tr. p. 52, L. 15-24] JUDD's procedural due process rights were
violated when he was confronted with this new issue without proper notice, and he did not have a
meaningful opportunity to be heard when he was asked to interpret the Assessor's information
concerning his parcel.
In addition, the Commissioners did not confine their decision to the evidence presented
by the witnesses, but instead conducted their own fact gathering session and offered their own
testimony in violation of Mr. Judd's due process rights. Although Mr. Judd was given a token
opportunity to respond to the new evidence presented against his request, none of the other
people present at the hearing were even offered a chance to speak before the hearing was again
closed on a motion by Commissioner Currie that was unanimously approved without hesitation
or discussion. [Board Tr. p. 47, L. 5-13]

8

The Assessor's information sheet for the Judd parcel is at pg. 192 of the Agency Record.

Respondents' Brief - Judd v. Kootenai County

Page 23

4.

The district court did not substitute its judgment for. that of the Board as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

The district court did not disagree with or change any of the findings of fact by the Board
of Commissioners. As a matter of fact, all of the Board's findings of fact listed in Section II of
their Order of Decision are correct. [A.R. p. 175-176] The district court disagreed with the
Board's conclusions oflaw.
I.C. §67-5279(3) states in part, "the court shall affirm the agency action unless the court
finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decision are:
(a) ...

(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."

There is no indication that the district court engaged in any weighing of the evidence on
questions of fact. There was essentially no dispute between the parties regarding the underlying
facts of this case. Instead, the district court held that the County's conclusions were not
supported by the factual record.
As argued above, there are no. facts in the record to support the Board's conclusion that
the variance was in conflict with the public interest where there was no public opposition, no
agency opposition and no County staff opposition. There are no facts in the record to support the
Board's conclusion that the variance was not necessary to accommodate the reasonable use of
the land. The photographic evidence and uncontested testimony clearly showed the absolute
need for the setback variance requested by JUDD. More importantly, the Board agreed that a
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literal enforcement of the setback would cause an undue hardship. And finally, there are no facts
in the record to suppo1i the Board's conclusion that the variance would confer a special privilege
on JUDD not enjoyed by others. The approval of any variance requires two findings: (I) an
undue hardship because of the characteristics of the site, and (2) that the requested variance is
not in conflict with the public interest. LC. §67-6516. The County correctly found that the
characteristics of the JUDD parcel would create an undue hardship if the 25 foot setback was
enforced. However, there was no evidence in the record, and the County made no findings, to
support its conclusion that the JUDD variance was in conflict with the public interest. On the
contrary, the evidence in the record and the County's own findings support the opposite
conclusion - that the JUDD variance was not in conflict with tl1e public interest. It is precisely
because of the undue hardship and because of the lack of opposition that granting the variance
would not confer a special privilege to JUDD.

It was the absence of any evidence supporting the County's conclusions that lead the
district court to hold the County's decision was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.
For these reasons, the district court ordered the County to grant the variance, and remanded the
matter back to the Board to determine only the extent of the variance to be granted.
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5.

It was not error for the district court to remand the matter back to the Board
for a determination of the extent of the variance to be granted.

Having detennined that the JUDD variance should be granted, the court correctly
declined to weigh the evidence on the factual question of whether the requested variance was the
minimum necessary to allow a reasonable use of the land. Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance
Section 30.03(c)(3) requires a finding. "[t]hat the variance is the minimum variance that will
make possible the reasonable use of the land, building, or structure."
Although the only evidence and testimony received by the Hearing Examiner and County
Commissioners was that JUDD could not use the property at all without creating a level place to
sit or stand, the district court understood that this factual finding could only be made by the
Board of Commissioners. The district court correctly remanded the matter back to the Board for
that factual detennination.

6.

The decision of the Board of Commissioners was made upon unlawful
procedure.

As an additional issue on appeal, JUDD claims that the County's decision was made
upon unlawful procedure; specifically the violations of JUDD's procedural due process rights
detailed in Section III, Part 3 above.
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7.

The decision of the Board of Commissioners was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.

As an additional issue on appeal, JUDD also claims that the decision of the Board of
Commissioners was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Although the district
court found that the County's decision to deny the variance request was not supported by any
evidence whatsoever, the court held that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of
discretion. For the reasons argued in Section III, Part 2 above, JUDD also claims that the
district court correctly overturned the Board of Commissioners pursuant to Idaho Code §675279(3)(d).

8.

The district court properly awarded attorney fees and costs to JUDD, and
JUDD is entitled to fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117.

Idaho Code §12-117 allows an award of reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable
expenses to the prevailing party, "if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
This Court interpreted Section 12-117 in Bogner v. State Department of Revenue and
Taxation, 107 Idaho 854,693 P.2d 1056 (1984):

We believe the purpose of that statute is two-fold: (1) to serve
as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2)
to.provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless
charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never
had made. Accord Van Gordon v. Oregon State Board of Dental
Examiners, 63 Or.App. 561, 666 P.2d 276, 280 (1983).
Id. 107 Idaho at 859.
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In Rural Kootenai Organization v. Board of Commissioners, 133 Idaho 833,993 P.2d
596 ( 1999) the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners approved a preliminary subdivision
plat after concluding that the proposal complied with the applicable ordinance requirements.
After finding that the proposal did not comply with the ordinance requirements for open space
and proof of ownership, this Court held that the Board had acted without a reasonable basis in
fact and approved an award of attorney fees against Kootenai County under § 12-117. Id 133
Idaho at 845, 846.
Finally, in Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2002) this
Court upheld the district court's award of attorney fees to Sanders Orchard pursuant to §12-117.
On a petition for judicial review of the decision by the Gem County Board of Commissioners to
deny a subdivision application by Sanders Orchard, the district court determined that the Board
had exceeded its statutory authority and that the Board's findings of fact and conclusions oflaw
were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Gem County appealed the district
court decision and this Court affirmed the award of fees to Sanders Orchard pursuant to § 12-117
as follows:
In this case, the Board's decision hinged upon its finding that
"it is projected that development of central sewer system and
water lines will be extended to that area in the reasonably near
future." The Board has not pointed to any evidence it considered
that would support that finding. Therefore, by basing its
decision upon this finding, the Board acted without a reasonable
basis in fact. The district court's award of attorney fees to
Sanders Orchard is affirmed.

Id 137 Idaho at 703.
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In the present case, Kootenai County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law when
it denied the JUDD variance request. It appears that the Commissioners in this case were upset
by the fact that JUDD built the decks without first obtaining building permits, aud that irrelevant
fact distracted the Commissioners from making their decision based on the relevant facts and the
proper law. Without auy evidence to support their decision, the Commissioners concluded that
the requested variauce would conflict with the public interest. Because the County acted without
a reasonable basis in fact or law, it was proper for the district court to award fees and costs to
JUDD under LC. §12-117. An independent review of the record before the district court should
lead this Court to the same conclusion.
The County argues that it was inappropriate for the district court to award fees under
section 12-117 because the County was interpreting and applying Idaho Code aud its Zoning
Ordinance to improvements constructed without a building permit. The County argues that,
under these circumstauces, the County's decision was reasonable given the lack of any Idaho
case law for guidance. The County concludes: "Therefore, even though the District Court
decided that the Board's decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, an
award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-117 would be inappropriate even if this Court were
to affirm the decision of the District Court because the Board's decision had a reasonable basis in
fact aud existing statutes, case law, and county ordinauces, aud because this action involved the
interpretation of very broad statute aud county ordinauce language in a context which has not
been definitively addressed by Idaho's appellate courts." [Appellant's Brief, p. 23]
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Of course, the district court did not hold that the County's decision was based on an
"erroneous interpretation of applicable law." The district court quite clearly overturned the
County's decision because it was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The facts
of this case do not present an issue of first impression, and Idaho Code §67-6516 is neither
ambiguous nor lacking in appellate interpretation. The Board of Commissioners did not struggle
to apply the facts of this case to "very broad statute and county ordinance language." They
simply ignored the record and their own findings of fact, and reached conclusions without any
factual basis or support in the record. Such behavior supports an award of attorney fees to JUDD
under LC. § 12-117.
Finally, JUDD seeks an award of attorney fees and expenses on appeal under Idaho
Appellate Rule 41, and pursuant to I. C. § 12-117 and § 12-121. Kootenai County has pursued this
appeal without legal or factual foundation.

IV.

CONCLUSION
This case is not factually or legally complicated. The record shows that the JUDD

variance request satisfied both elements of Idaho Code §67-6516 and all the standards of the
Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance. Unfortunately, the Board of Commissioners focused their
attention on the legally irrelevant fact that JUDD built the decks without first obtaining a
building permit. Because of this distraction, the County concluded that the variance was in
conflict with the public interest even though there was no factual evidence in the record to
support such a conclusion. The district court reviewed the agency record and correctly
determined that the County had no factual basis to deny the variance request. The district court
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properly remanded the matter back to the County for a determination of the extent of the
variance that would allow reasonable use of the land. Because the County acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law, the district court awarded fees and costs under LC. §12-117.
Accordingly, JUDD requests that this Court affirm the district court's ruling and award
fees and costs to JUDD on appeal.

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of April, 2008.
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